g . r$ = United States represents a sudden organization of medicine as a corporate enterprise managed according to business principles.'
Yet strategies that apply elements of concurrent economic organization to medical care have a much longer history. This report uses a social history approach that studies past endeavors to reform medicine in order to illuminate contemporary ones.2 Its thesis is that the 1927-1932 blue-ribbon Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC) also applied elements of economic organization to medical care. The committee sought to expand the use in medicine of financial management, group organization, and revenuegenerating services, which themselves incorporated features of business organization. Historians the "crisis in hospital finance.""l The CCMC's proposed solution to both problems was to reform the "deficiencies of the present economic organization of medicine," as a confidential report to the execu-Public Health Then and Now projected Five-Year Program identified the "ultimate question" to be the best organization offering the "most efficient production of service."'3 The committee's summary volume, The Costs ofMedical Care, similarly defined its purpose to be diagnosis of the "economic organization of medical care"; it defined such organization as the "methods of producing and financing medical services." '14 This report focuses on the recommended production methods rather than financing, a topic that has been covered much more extensively in the literature.
Most historical investigation of the CCMC has emphasized its broad spectrum of features and motives, rather than its economic elements. Paul Starr associated its recommendations with expanded access and increased professional power as well as with bureaucratic organization. The CCMC did not just follow the social reforms and theories of the New Economic Era. Some of its members were social scientists deeply engaged in developing the theories. Economist Wesley C. Mitchell's work, for example, framed a theoretical basis for Hoover's attempts to "rationalize" industry and to ameliorate recessional phases of what Mitchell called business cycles.3' A number of CCMC studies used sociologist and CCMC member William F. Ogbum's theory of cultural lag to diagnose problems of medical care. Fox interpreted the CCMC's use of cultural lag as a "convenient metaphor" for reorganizing medical care.32 But it was more than a metaphor; it was a strategy that related directly to the desired restructuring. The economists on the committee used the theory of cultural lag to mean a failure of the development ofthe economic organization ofmedicine to keep up with the development of economic organization in industry.
As chairman of Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, Wesley C. Mitchell identified one of the trends as a "conscious drive to make our economic organization meet the need of the time." And, he said, there had been a "lag in this process. " Winslow, chairman of the Executive Committee, answered yes to his question, "Can the business analogy, however faulty and incomplete, help us towards methods of realizing the nobler functions of medicine as an art and a science and a profession?"38 Such a dual perspective of service and business continued throughout the CCMC's work.
In addition to service, CCMC reports associated their recommended reorganization of medicine with the widely popular image of efficiency. Comparing medical delivery with "production in any industry," The Fundamentals of Good Medical Care defined the reorganization goal as producing the "maximum amount and the highest quality of service with the minimum of wasted effort."39 I am arguing not that such a concept of efficiency drove CCMC reforms but that CCMC reports linked the concept to particular components of structural reform. As the remainder of this article will show, the reports attributed enhanced efficiency to each of their recommended organizational forms.
Historian 46 CCMC reports correspondingly promoted ongoing efforts to apply to medicine methods of accounting47 and other managerial "techniques borrowed from industry." 48 The CCMC's final report, Medical Care for the American People, advised establishing local or regional coordinating agencies in order to control an area's capital investment. These agencies would organize the medical producers and consumers in the area49 Also implying some form of democratic control, staff member C. Rufus Rorem used the phrase "the public's investment" to emphasize that approximately half of the $3 billion invested in hospitals had originated in public funding.50 Yet the final report also described a partnership between medical professionals and the owners of capital, and it delegated financial responsibility to the owners.5' Regardless of the extent to which the CCMC designated capitalists, experts, or "the public" to manage hospital expenditures, the committee's proposals would have reduced the power of organized medicine and increased that ofthe owners ofcapital.
In a campaign against institutional medicine and its shifting control, the American Medical Association's Bureau of Medical Economics charged the CCMC with making a "false analogy with industrial capital."52 The bureau challenged the CCMC's $3 billion appraisal of the hospital system in terms of exchange value. In contrast, the bureau director maintained, accumulation of scientific knowledge was the chief capital investment in medicine.53 This kind of capital, he asserted, did not encourage growth of productive units, it did not usually return a profit, and most importantly, it did not "confer on the owners the power to control the employment and the actions ofthe physicians."54 Public Health Then and Now were highly capitalized "business organizations."66 The authors of Costs ofMedical Care appreciated that organizing specialists into groups represented the next step usually followed in making production more efficient. 67 Recommendation number 1 of the CCMC's final report advised that medical care should be delivered by groups, preferably those organized around hospitals.68 An April 1931 internal discussion paper prepared for the executive committee had apparently attempted to define the desired organization in greater detail. Identifying the question as which form of organization offered both the highest quality of care and the most economic use of capital, it offered 2 alternative answers. The first succinctly stated that the then-current organization was sufficient and "probably not far behind the mercantile industries in efficiency of organization." The second choice was considerably more detailed and indicated that "economies through mass production" could be achieved by building highly equipped group facilities operated by professional managers and salaried personnel.69
The major conflict within the CCMC was between advocates of institution-based group practice and those of individual prac- was deemed "no less desirable in medicine than in industry."9' Once the actual cost was determined, it would be a managerial decision whether or not to charge the full amount in individual cases. It was noted, however, that hospital administrators were beginning to define setting prices lower than full cost as unfair competition.92 The principle of selfsupport thrust hospital services and group medicine into the market. It increasingly compelled them to compete for paying patients, to manage their institutions according to the bottom line, and to restructure their services, despite their service missions.
In this report I have examined features of economic organization in the CCMC's reorganization strategies in financial management, institution-based group organization, and fee services. The CCMC did not originate the incorporation of business components into medical care, but it put them on the 20th-century medical reform agenda. In the process, it also invented the social and eco- But it is not such a leap as commonly thought from health reform in the New Economic Era to reform in the Economic Era of Health Care. The CCMC also tried to integrate doctors and hospitals (and sometimes payments) into corporate organizations. The recent managed care "revolution" has further developed the business components that the CCMC recommended: financial management, group organization, and selective development of revenue-generating services. The extent to which delivery organizations or insurance companies should control payments is still a significant issue. From the time ofthe CCMC and its minority report, reforms in medical delivery have portrayed the organizational choice as 1 of 2 business models: either individual entrepreneurial or institutional corporate models. This dualism has restricted serious search for altemative forms of medical care organization. D
